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I. INTRODUCTION
"[I]t is better that an individual should sustain an injury than the
public should suffer an inconvenience."1
The notion that public entities and their employees should be insulated from
tort liability in specific instances is certainly not a controversial theory. Common
sense tells us that if public entities and their agents were openly exposed to
litigation, political subdivisions would face enormous burdens, economically,
socially, and politically. These entities would have difficulty sustaining themselves
Gerald P. Krause, Comment, Municipal Liability: The Failure To Provide Adequate Police
Protection - The Special Duty Doctrine Should Be Discarded, 1984 WiS. L. REv. 499, 529 (citing
Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (1788)).
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when faced with the possibility of litigation every time a member of the public had
a grievance. But in some jurisdictions, common sense is ignored when a human life
is lost, whatever the role of the public entity or its agents. Consider the case where
a woman is killed in an automobile accident by a drunk driver, a repeat offender
who was not only a notorious drunk, but had been involved in another fatal accident
only four months prior.2 The investigating officer of the first accident did not
incarcerate the driver or revoke his driv er's license. When faced with these facts,
a clear majority of courts would not impose liability on the police officer, the police
department or the municipality for failure to restrain or incarcerate the drunk
driver On July 16, 1997, in Holsten v. Massey, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals joined the majority of courts and insulated the County Commission, the
deputy sheriff, and the sheriff's department from a negligence cause of action
involving a fatal drunk driving accident.4
The main discussion in Holsten, however, did not revolve around the tragic
facts of the case. Instead, the court discussed the essence of the common law public
duty doctrine, its special relationship exception, the Governmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform Act5 and how these common law and statutory authorities can
survive together.6 The opinion provides a history of the public duty doctrine in
West Virginia and the subsequent emergence of the Governmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform Act 7 It also stresses the importance of these doctrines'
coexistence, absent specific legislative abrogation.8 In deference to other prevailing
theories, however, the court does not ignore the fact that some jurisdictions have
2 Holsten v. Massey, 490 S.E.2d 864 (W. Va. 1997).
3 See, e.g.,Shore v. Town of Stonington, 44 A.2d 1379, 1383 (Conn. 1982) (holding that
although a drunk driver had been stopped but not arrested by a police officer, the plaintiff had no cause
of action in negligence against the officer or the town for failure to enforce motor vehicle laws
governing reckless driving and driving while under the influence); accord Landis v. Rockdale County,
445 S.E.2d 264, 267 (Ga. 1994) (holding that a widow of deceased motorist did not have a cause of
action against the county, sheriff or deputy because a deputy sheriff's duty to enforce drunk driving
laws was to the public in general, not specifically to the motorist who was killed in the collision with
a drunk driver whom the deputy had failed to arrest).
See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 864.
W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-1 to -18.
6 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 870.
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abandoned the public duty doctrine with the subsequent passage of tort liability
legislation for political subdivisions.9
This Comment will examine the decision of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in Holsten v. Massey. It will provide a brief history of municipal
liability in West Virginia, paying particular attention to the relevant common law
and statutory authority. It will also discuss two approaches to municipal liability
adopted by various jurisdictions, with an analysis of the policy considerations
adopted by both views.
II. HOLSTEN V. MASSEY
On April 26, 1993, the appellant's wife, Angela Holsten, was killed in a car
accident in Boone County, West Virginia when Russell Massey crossed the center
line and drove head-on into Mrs. Holsten's car."° Massey's blood-alcohol content
measured .284.11
On December 26, 1992, approximately four months prior to this accident,
Massey had been involved in another accident ("1992 Accident") in which he drove
a vehicle while allegedly under the influence of alcohol wherein his only passenger
was killed. 2 The facts surrounding the 1992 Accident are in dispute. Deputy
Greene, the deputy who investigated the 1992 Accident, recalled of that evening
that the roadways in Boone County were slick and icy and that he had investigated
two other single-car accidents prior to Massey's accident. 3 Deputy Greene spoke
with Mr. Massey only for a few minutes before he was taken to a local area
hospital,' 4 but at the hospital, Deputy Greene talked with Massey and discovered
that he had, in fact, been drinking. 5 Furthermore, Deputy Greene noted in his
9 Id. at 872.
10 Id. at 867.
11 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 867. According to the West Virginia Code, any person who has
an alcohol concentration in his blood often hundredths of one percent or more, by weight is guilty of
a felony. W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-2(a)(1)(E) (1996).
12 Id.
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police report that other officers at the scene had observed that Massey had been
drinking. 6
The appellants asserted that Deputy Greene recklessly failed to obtain
Massey's blood test results as an integral part of the criminal investigation, even
though he was informed they were readily available. 7 Furthermore, certain hospital
employees denied that Deputy Greene had even requested the results; however, the
appellees asserted that Deputy Greene went to great lengths to obtain the blood test
results, and that the hospital ignored subpoenas requesting the production of them. 8
Regardless of why the results were not available, it was not until April 21, 1993,
five days before Mrs. Holsten's accident, that Massey was indicted for the
passenger's death in the 1992 Accident. 9
The appellant contended that if the 1992 Accident had been properly
investigated, his wife's accident would never have occurred because Massey would
have been incarcerated or, at least, would have had his license revoked.2 ° In
addition, the complaint alleged that the County Commission of Boone County was
also liable for damages caused by the negligence of Deputy Greene pursuant to the
Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act?'
The Circuit Court of Boone County granted summary judgment in favor of
the appellees because the appellees were not liable for the failure to provide
adequate police protection, and because the appellant failed to assert any facts
giving rise to a special relationship under the public duty doctrine.' Furthermore,
the circuit court noted that even if the appellant had asserted the breach of a special
duty, the appellees were still immune under the Governmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform Act.'
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H. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
The history in West Virginia of the qualified immunity, from tort
liability, available to municipalities and certain other political
subdivisions of the state is consistent with the typical pattern in
most of the other jurisdictions: a broad, often total, abrogation by
the judiciary of the state common-law local governmental tort
immunity, followed soon thereafter by the enactment of
governmental tort claims, legislation, typically providing in
substance for a broad reinstatement of local governmental
immunity from tort liability 4
A. Local Governmental Immunity: Constitutional and Common-Law
Authority
Article VI, section thirty-five of the West Virginia Constitution grants
immunity from claims against the state.5 This concept of sovereign immunity also
applied to municipalities until 1974, when the court in Higginbotham v. City of
Charleston26 specifically abrogated the concept as applied to municipalities. In
other words, the state's absolute immunity from tort liability would no longer be
available to a municipality. A year after the Higginbotham decision, the court
decided Long v. City of Weirton,2  which removed even more immunity from
municipalities. In Long, the court held that the "rule of municipal governmental
immunity [was] now abolished in this state,"'2 and that "[a] municipal corporation
24 Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dept, 412 S.E.2d 737, 743 (W. Va. 1991).
25 This section states in part that the State of West Virginia shall never be made a defendant
in any court of law or equity. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.
26 204 S.E.2d 1, Syl. Pt. 4 (W. Va. 1974) (holding that cities could be held liable in private
actions for failure to maintain its streets and sidewalks in violation of a state statute).
27 214 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975). In Long, a minor child was injured in a gas explosion and
her divorced parents brought a negligence action against the gas company, the city, and the two
companies which were performing work on the street for the city at the time the gas main was struck.
Id. at 840. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against the gas company, but
held that the city was immune under the theory of governmental immunity and was not a joint
tortfeasor. Id. at 842. On appeal, the court held that the evidence sustained finding that the gas
company's and the city's negligence was concurrent and that municipal governmental immunity was
abolished. Ida at 859.
28 Id. at Syl. Pt. 10.
1997]
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shall be liable, as if a private person, for injuries inflicted upon members of the
public which are proximately caused by its negligence in the performance of
functions assumed by it."'29 The court in Long also discussed the inconsistent
application of the governmental/proprietary distinction and explicitly abolished the
dichotomy 0 In extending Long, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals also
abolished the common-law tort immunity for county commissions and for boards
of education. 1 After these decisions and the apparent total abrogation of municipal
immunity, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals tried to limit the effects of
these holdings by invoking the public duty doctrine in subsequent decisions.
1. Public Duty Doctrine
Although it achieves much the same result as the doctrine of governmental
immunity, the public duty doctrine is an independent principle?2 Under the public
duty doctrine, a governmental entity is not liable because of its failure to enforce
29 Id at Syl. Pt. 11.
30 The Long court traced the government/proprietary distinction to the 19th century and
discussed Mendel & Co. v. City of Wheeling, 28 W. VA. 233 (1886), and how the distinction was to
be defined:
It seems therefore to be well settled, that, when a municipal corporation through
its officers as agents is merely carrying out or exercising its' purely governmental
powers, it is not liable for any negligence of its officers or agents. This is so held
from the wisest public policy; because, should a different rule obtain, municipal
corporations could not exist. But there is another large class of cases, in which the
powers of a municipal corporation are extended beyond what is strictly necessary
for the protection of the lives, health, prosperity and peace of its citizens; as where
it carries on works of internal improvement and in the construction of these works
there is misfeasance, and by the unskillful and careless doing of the thing
authorized to be done, persons or property are injured. In such cases the
municipal corporation is held liable.
See Long, 214 S.E.2d at 856 (quoting Mendel & Co. v. City of Wheeling, 28 W. VA. at 247-248)
(emphasis added).
31 Gooden v. County Comm'n, 298 S.E.2d 103 (W. Va. 1982); Ohio Valley Contractors v. Bd.
of Educ., 293 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1982).
32 See Benson v. Kutsch, 380 S.E.2d 36, 37 (W. Va. 1989). In Benson, an occupant of an
apartment sued the city of Wheeling for injuries sustained in a fire. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the
city was negligent in failing to inspect the apartment building. Id An inspection would have revealed
that the apartment building was not equipped with smoke detectors which was a violation of building
and housing codes. Id The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and
the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the enactment of a fire and building code by the
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regulatory or penal statutes.33 This doctrine was derived from the rule stated by the
United States Supreme Court in South v. Maryland,34 which held that a sheriff was
not liable for the kidnapping of an individual because a sheriff's duty to enforce the
law was "a public duty, for neglect of which he is amenable to the public and
punishable by indictment only."'35 Accordingly, the rationale behind the doctrine
is to circumvent the difficulty in determining when a failure to perform properly
gives rise to a cause of action. Furthermore, it would be impractical to require a
public official to be responsible for every infraction of a regulation that requires
enforcement.36 Moreover, "[tihere is the added principle that the government
should be able to enact laws for the protection of the public without thereby
exposing the taxpayers to liability for omissions in its attempts to enforce them. 37
Thus, a public official's breach of a general duty does not give rise to a cause of
action unless such cause of action is specifically intended by the ordinance or
regulation. However, the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine
exists and, thus, the doctrine is not a guarantee against tort liability for a municipal
corporation.
2. Special Relationship Exception
A special relationship between an individual and a government entity can
give rise to liability in certain situations" and can undermine the immunity granted
by the public duty doctrine. Prior to the existence of any bright-line rules, when
determining whether a special relationship existed, the determination was usually
33 Id. at 38.
34 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396,403 (1855). The plaintiff in South claimed that the sheriff knew he
had been kidnapped and where he was detained, yet did nothing to secure his release. Md.
35 Id.
36 Benson, 380 S.E.2d at 38.
37 r4
38 Icl at 40.
1997]
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fact-specific3 9 However, in Wolfe v. City of Wheeling,4 the court adopted a four-
part test to determine if a special relationship exists:
To establish that a special relationship exists between a local
governmental entity and an individual, which is the basis for a
special duty owed to such an individual, the following elements
must be shown: (1) an assumption by the local governmental
entity, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on
behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of
the local governmental entity's agents that inaction could lead to
harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the local
governmental entity's agents and the injured party; and (4) that
party's justifiable reliance on the local governmental entity's
affirmative undertaking.41
The Wolfe court emphasized that the injured party's reliance is a critical step in
establishing the existence of a special relationship because the element of reliance
provides the "essential causative link between the special duty assumed by the local
governmental entity and the injury."' 2 Furthermore, the element of direct contact
is
conceptually related to the element of reliance and is a corollary of
the need to show a 'special relationship' between the plaintiff(s)
and the local governmental entity beyond the relationship with the
government that all the citizens share in common. In addition, the
requirement of direct contact serves as a basis for rationally
39 Some jurisdictions, like New York, relied on the specific facts to determine whether a special
relationship exists. See, e.g., Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1985). In
Sorichetti, liability was imposed on the city for injuries a father inflicted on his infant daughter. Id.
at 77. The child's mother had secured a protective order against the father, last contacting the police
on the day the infant was severely abused. Id. at 74. Based on these facts, the court found a special
relationship between the police and the plaintiff and held the city liable. Id. at 75.
40 387 S.E.2d 307 (W. Va. 1989). In Wolfe, two homeowners sued the city alleging negligence
and breach of contract when the city's fire department failed to respond to the fire at their home. Id.
at 309. The house was outside the city's borders, but the homeowners had, nevertheless, paid the fire
fee. Il at 308. The circuit court certified questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals as to what test
determined when a special duty existed. Id. at 310.
41 See Wolfe, 387 S.E.2d at 307, Syl. Pt. 2.
42 Id. at 311 (citing Cufly v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937, 940 (N.Y. 1987)).
[Vol. 100:243
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss1/12
HOLSTEN v. MASSEY
limiting the class of individuals to whom the local governmental
entity's 'special' duty extends. 3
Thus, it seems as though the correct inquiry as to whether a municipal corporation
is liable in tort is whether a special relationship existed between the injured party
and the governmental entity.
B. Local Governmental Immunity: Statutory Authority
Initially, the state could not be named as a defendant in a court of law or
equity." However, a plaintiff was not without any recourse; he could seek a
recognition by the legislature of his claim as a moral obligation of the state,
pursuant to West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation ActOs In addition to
providing a method of redressing claims under the moral obligation theory, the
legislature also authorized the state to purchase insurance providing coverage for
its property, activities, and responsibilities, regardless of its sovereign immunity.46
43 Id (citing Cuffy, 505 N.E.2d at 940).
44 W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.
45 See Parkulo v. West Virginia Bd. of Probation and Parole, 483 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 1996)
(mentioning W. VA. CODE § 14-2A-2 (1995)). Section 14-2A-2 reads as follows:
The Legislature finds and declares that a primary purpose of government is to
provide for the safety of citizens and the inviolability of their property. To the
extent that innocent citizens are victims of crime, particularly violent crime, and
are without adequate redress for injury to their person or property, this primary
purpose of government is defeated .... In establishing the West Virginia crime
reparation act of 1981, the Legislature stated its findings that the provision of
governmental services to prevent crime is not wholly effective and expressed its
intent to establish a system of compensation for the victims of crime which would
provide a partial remedy for the failure of the state to fully achieve this primary
purpose of government.
The Legislature now finds that the system of compensation established by the
act as an experimental effort by the Legislature of this state on behalf of its people
... should be continued and retained in the legislative branch of government as
an expression of moral obligation of the state to provide partial compensation to
the innocent victims of crime for injury suffered to their person or property.
W. VA. CODE § 14-2A-2 (1995) (emphasis added)).
46 See Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d at 514 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 29-12-5(a) (1992)). Section 29-12-
5(a) reads as follows:
The board [of risk and insurance management] shall have general supervision and
control over the insurance of all state property, activities and responsibilities,
including the acquisition and cancellation thereof; determination of amount and
1997]
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In fact, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals also recognized the erosion of
sovereign immunity when it held that "[s]uits which seek no recovery from State
funds, but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the
State's liability insurance coverage, fall outside the traditional bar to suits against
the State."'47 The court did eventually mandate, however, that the pleadings must
state the qualifications entitling the injured party to bring the claim, that the
recovery sought is limited to the applicable insurance coverage, and the scope of the
coverage and its exceptions must be apparent from the record.48
Along with providing some redress for injured plaintiffs against the state
in chapter twenty nine, article twelve, the legislature also limited tort liability for
political subdivisions by enacting the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform Act (the Act).49 The Act was deemed constitutional in Randall
v. Fairmont City Police Department, when it survived claims that it denied
constitutional remedies and that it violated equal protection. The purpose of the
kind of.coverage, including, but not limited to, deductible forms of insurance
coverage, inspections or examinations relating thereto, reinsurance, and any and
all matters, factors and considerations entering into negotiations for advantageous
rates on and coverage of all such state property, activities and responsibilities.
Any policy of insurance purchased or contracted for by the board shall provide
that the insurer shall be barred and estopped from relying upon the constitutional
immunity of the state of West Virginia against claims or suits; Provided, That
nothing herein shall bar the insurer of political subdivisions from trying upon any
statutory immunity granted such political subdivisions against claims or suits ....
W. VA. CODE § 29-12-5(a) (1992).
47 Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. West Virginia. Bd. of Regents, 310 S.E.2d 675, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va.
1983). Accord Eggleston v. West Virginia. Dept. of Highways, 429 S.E.2d 636, Syl. Pt. I (W. Va.
1993); see also State ex rel. West Virginia. Dept. of Transp. Highways Div. v. Madden, 453 S.E.2d
331,334 (W. Va. 1994) (holding that Pittsburgh Elevator and Eggleston assert that coverage for the
state's liability is provided by the limits of the state's liability insurance and not state funds).
48 See Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d at 516. In Parkulo, the plaintiff sued the West Virginia Board of
Probation and Parole and Division of Corrections after she was abducted, raped and beaten by a
parolee. Id at 511. The circuit court granted the board's motion to dismiss and the division's motion
for summaryjudgment Id at 512. On appeal, the court held that the public duty doctrine applied to
both the board and division and that there was insufficient evidence whether the state's purchase of
insurance waived its defenses. See id. at Syl. Pts. 5 & 10.
49 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-1-18 (1992).
50 See Randall, 412 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 1, stating,
When legislation either substantially impairs vested rights or severely limits
existing procedural remedies permitting court adjudication, thereby implicating
the certain remedy provision of article III, section 17 of the Constitution of West
Virginia, the legislation will be upheld under that provision if, first, a reasonably
[Vol. 100:243
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Act is to limit tort liability of political subdivisions5' and to provide tort immunity
in certain situations in order to regulate the costs and coverage of insurance
available for such liability5 2 Furthermore, the legislature found that
political subdivisions of this state are unable to procure adequate
liability insurance coverage at a reasonable cost due to: The high
cost of defending such claims, the risk of liability beyond
affordable coverage, and the inability of political subdivisions to
raise sufficient revenues for the procurement of such coverage
without reducing the quantity and quality of traditional
governmental services. Therefore, it is necessary to establish
certain immunities and limitations with regard to the liability of
political subdivisions and their employees, to regulate the
insurance industry providing liability insurance to them, and
thereby permit such political subdivisions to provide necessary
needed governmental services to its citizens within" the limits of
their available revenues.
5 3
effective alternative remedy is provided by the legislation, or, second, if no such
alternative remedy is provided, the purpose of the alteration or repeal of the
existing cause of action or remedy is to eliminate or curtail a clear social or
economic problem, and the alteration or repeal of the existing cause of action or
remedy is a reasonable method of achieving such purpose.
See id. at Syl. Pt. 4, stating,
Where economic rights are concerned, we look to see whether the classification
is a rational one based on social, economic, historic or geographic factors, whether
it bears a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose, and whether
all persons within the class are treated equally. Where such classification is
rational and bears the requisite reasonable relationship, the statute does not violate
Section 10 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution, which is our equal
protection clause.
51 A political subdivision includes a municipality, a county commission, a county board of
education, and certain other local governmental entities. W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-3(c) (1992).
52 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-1 (1992).
53 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-2 (1992). For a more comprehensive overview of the Act, see
Johnny M. Knisely, II, Note, Tort Reform: The Reemergence ofLocal Government Immunity, The West
Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act of 1986, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 466 (1987).
1997]
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According to the Act, a political subdivision is insulated from civil liability when
its acts or omissions cause a death, injury or loss to persons or property5 4 The Act
also immunizes an employee of a political subdivision from tort liability, "unless
his or her acts were manifestly outside the scope of employment or official
responsibilities; [his or her] acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad
faith or in a wanton or reckless manner; or unless any statute expressly imposes
liability upon the employee." '
The Randall court analyzed the Act's relevant section for purposes of the
Holsten decision, which is chapter twenty nine, article 12A, section 5(a)(5). 6 That
section reads that a political subdivision is immune, among other things, from
liability for "the failure to provide, or the method of providing, police, law
enforcement or fire protection[.]" '57 The Randall court construed the immunity
provided by that section to be subject to the public duty doctrine, notwithstanding
the special relationship exception.5 ' Furthermore, the Randall court limited the
application of the public duty doctrine to nondiscretionary functions because the
Act incorporated the common-law rule of local governmental immunity with respect
to legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutorial functions
as seen in chapter twenty nine, article 12A, section 5(a)(1)-(2),(4) 9 The Randall
court did point out, however, that unless the legislature has provided for immunity
54 See Randall, 412 S.E.2d at 742 (citing W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-4(b)(1) (1992)).
55 See Randall, 412 S.E.2d at 742-743 (citing W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(b)(1)-(3) (1992)); see
also State v. Chase Securities, Inc., 424 S.E.2d 591,.599-600 (W. Va. 1992) ("[A] public executive
official who is acting within the scope of his authority and the provisions of W. VA. Code 29-12-1,
et. seq., is entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability for official acts if the involved conduct
did not violate clearly established laws of which a reasonable official would have known. There is no
immunity for an executive official whose acts are fraudulent, malicious, or otherwise oppressive.")
(overruling State ex rel. Boone Nat'l Bank of Madison v. Manns, 29 S,E.2d 621 (W. Va. 1944)
(footnotes omitted)).
56 See Randall, 412 S.E.2d at 748.
57 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(5) (1992).
58 See Randall, 412 S.E.2d at 747-748 (stating that "the duty to provide ... police protection
runs ordinarily to all citizens ... therefore absent a special duty to the plaintiff, no liability attaches
to a ... police department's failure to provide adequate... police protection") (citing Wolfe, 387
S.E.2d at 310))). In Randall, the wrongful death and negligence action was brought on behalf of the
decedent's estate who was killed by a man who had been harassing her. The decedent had notified the
police numerous times about her assailant, and ironically, was killed beside the city police department
building. Randall, 412 S.E.2d at 740-741.
59 Id at 747, n.13.
[Vol. 100:243
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss1/12
HOLSTEN v. MASSEY
under the circumstances, "the general common-law goal of compensating injured
parties for damages caused by negligent acts must prevail.:
60
With a basic understanding and limited overview of municipal liability and
immunity in West Virginia, the Holsten case can now be examined in light of the
common law and statutory authority's coexistence.
IV. THE COURT'S DECISION
A. The Public Duty Doctrine
The Holsten court began its opinion by providing the standard of review for
a circuit court's entry of summary judgment and for granting summary judgment.61
Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the circuit court erred in
concluding that the appellant failed to present any evidence that the law
enforcement officer breached any duty to the appellant or the decedent, such as
failing to adequately protect the decedent by conducting an insufficient
investigation of the 1992 Accident. 62
The court first tackled the issue of whether Deputy Greene had a duty to the
appellant and/or to the decedent.63 The court explained that the failure to provide
adequate police protection to an individual is defined by the public duty doctrine; 6
because the duty is owed to the public as a whole, the failure to fulfill this duty is
not actionable in tort.65 However, the court quickly qualified the assertion and
stated that if the plaintiff can satisfy Wolfe's four-part test66 and establish a special
relationship, a lawsuit against the political subdivisions is entirely within reason.67
In its analysis, the court found that a special relationship between Mrs. Holsten and
Deputy Greene did not exist because there was no evidence that Deputy Greene
60 Id. at 748.
61 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 868-869.




66 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
67 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 870; see also supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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made any promises or acted in any way that would indicate that he assumed an
affirmative duty to protect the decedent! 8 Furthermore, the court found that there
was no evidence that Deputy Greene knew that the decedent would be injured by
Massey, that there had not been any contact with the decedent and Deputy Greene,
and that the decedent had not relied on Deputy Greene to protect her from Massey. 9
However, the appellant's argument was not based on the existence of a
special relationship, but rather he asserted that the legislative intent behind adopting
the Act was "to prohibit municipalities and county commissions from perpetuating
sovereign immunity in the guise of the public duty doctrine." '7  The court
determined, though, that the appellant confused the public duty doctrine with the
concept of immunity," for the public duty doctrine is not based on immunity from
existing liability, rather it determines whether or not a duty exists to give rise to
liability.72 Furthermore, the court stifled appellant's contention of "legislative
abrogation" by stating that the legislature has the authority to "enact statutes which
abrogate the common law," but that the legislature did not expressly abrogate the
public doctrine in the Act.74 Moreover, because this court had already established
that the Act did not abrogate the public duty doctrine in the context of the method
68 Id. The court noted, however, that the appellant did not argue that a special relationship
existed between the decedent and Deputy Greene. Id.
69 Id.
70 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 870; see also Appellant's Brief at 24, Holsten, 490 S.E.2d. 864.
71 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 870-871 (providing a history of the public duty doctrine and the
Local Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act); see supra notes 24-60.
72 Id at 871 (citing Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d at 518). The Parkulo court stated that "[w]e recognize
that the 'public duty doctrine' does not rest squarely on the principle of governmental immunity, but
rests on the principle that recovery may be had for negligence only if a duty has been breached which
was owed to the particular person seeking recovery." Parkulo, 483 S.E.2d at 518. The Holsten court
also cited Jones v. Wilcox, 476 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Mich.1991), appeal denied by 483 N.W.2d 918
(Mich. 1992) (stating that "[tihe public duty doctrine is premised on the existence of an element of a
cause of action for negligence. On the other hand, the governmental immunity issue concerns the
creation of exceptions to liability based on the functions of a governmental actor.").
73 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 871 (citing Perry v. Twentieth Street Bank, 206 S.E.2d 421, Syl.
(W. Va. 1974) ("By virtue of the authority of Article 8, Section 21 of the Constitution of West Virginia
and of Code, 1931, 2-1-1 it is within the province of the legislature to enact statutes which abrogate
the common law.").
74 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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of providing police protection,75 the appellant had to establish a "special
relationship" between the decedent and Deputy Greene in order to establish
liability.
76
After concluding that the public duty doctrine applied to the facts of the
case, the court relied on other jurisdictions to support its conclusion.77 The court
addressed the policy considerations that have been offered in support of the
retention of the doctrine.78 First,
[I]ndividuals, juries and courts are ill-equipped to judge
governmental decisions as to how particular community resources
should be or should have been allocated to protect individual
members of the public. Some courts have theorized that severe
depletion of those resources could well result if every oversight or
omission of a police official resulted in civil liability.79
A second policy consideration in retaining the public duty doctrine is that "police
officials often act and react in the milieu of criminal activity where every decision
is fraught with uncertainty."" Lastly, there are other methods of punishment, other
75 See W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(5) (1992).
76 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 875.
77 Id at 872.
78 Id. (citing Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 397-98 (Tenn. 1995)); see also generally,
Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HARv. L. REv. 821, 832-35 (1981).
In Ezell, the plaintiff sued the City of Elkton, the chief of police, and others on various theories of.
negligence after she was seriously injured and her husband was killed in a drunk driving accident. See
Ezell, 902 S.W.2d at 396-97. The plaintiff alleged that the chief of police allowed the driver of the
vehicle to operate the vehicle when he knew that the driver, along with the passenger, was intoxicated.
Id.
79 Ezell, 902 S.W.2d at 398 (citing Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306,1311 (D.C.
1983)).
80 Id (citing Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1311). The Ezell court also demonstrated this point citing
Shore v. Town ofStonington, 444 A.2d 1379 (Conn. 1982):
The adoption of a rule of liability where some kind of harm may happen to
someone would cramp the exercise of official discretion beyond the limits
desirable in our society. Should the officer try to avoid liability by removing from
the road all persons who pose any potential hazard, he may find himself liable in
many instances for false arrest. We do not think that the public interest is served
by allowing ajury of laymen with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight to second-guess
the exercise of a policeman's discretionary professional duty. Such discretion is
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than civil actions, such as internal disciplinary proceedings or criminal
prosecutions, in which a police officer is held accountable for his dereliction."' In
addition, other courts have reasoned that without the public duty doctrine, police
officials would be placed in the "untenable position of insuring the personal safety
of every member of the public, or fac[e] a civil suit for damages." 2
In further support of its conclusion, the court asserted that the cause of
action alleged by the appellant - that Deputy Greene failed to incarcerate Massey
after the first fatal accident and/or that he failed to revoke Massey's driver's license
- is the exact type of situation that, pursuant to the application of the public duty
doctrine, does not give rise to liability." Relying on Randall, the court stated that
no discretion at all.
Ezell, 902 S.W.2d at 398 (quoting Shore, 444 A.2d at 1384).
81 See Ezell, 902 S.W.2d at 398 (citing Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1312) ("Such courts have
concluded that, on balance, the community is better served by a policy that both protects the exercise
of law enforcement discretion and affords a means of review by supervisory personnel who are best
able to evaluate the officer's alleged negligent behavior.").
82 Id (citing Landis v. Rockdale County, 445 S.E.2d 264,268 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)). In Landis,
the court stated that "[a] policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged
with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause or being mulcted in damages
if he does." Ezell, 902 S.W.2d at 398 (quoting Landis, 445 S.E.2d at 268).
83 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 873; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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"'providing police protection runs ordinarily to all citizens,"' and thus, there is no
liability absent a special relationship.
Faced with the same facts as in Holsten, other jurisdictions have also held
that liability could not be imposed on police officers for failure to restrain drunk
drivers absent a "special relationship" with the injured party."5 For example, in
Crosby v. Town ofBethlehem,86 the mother of a young girl killed by a drunk driver
brought an action against the police officer and the police department for failing to
arrest or to prevent the drunk driver from operating his motorcycle. The plaintiff
84 Id. (citing Randall, 412 S.E.2d at 747-48. The appellant also argued, however, that Deputy
Greene's knowledge of a violation of a statute gives rise to a duty to any person who comes within the
risk caused by the violation of the statute. See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 875 n.1 1; see also Appellant's
Brief at 28-29, Holsten, 490 S.E.2d 864. The appellant argued that Deputy Greene violated West
Virginia Code chapter 17C, article 5A, section one, which addresses the police officer's authority to
take away the driver's license of a suspected drunk driver and report it to the Department of Motor
Vehicles within 48 hours. See Appellant's Brief at 28-29, Holsten, 490 S.E.2d 864. The appellant
concluded that Deputy Greene's failure to revoke Massey's license and knowledge of the statute
created a duty to protect the decedent because she fell within the class of users of the highway who
were to be protected from accidents caused by intoxicated drivers. Id at 28. However, the court
agreed with the appellees, who argued that West Virginia law does not impose a mandatory duty that
defines how law enforcement officials must investigate or arrest for criminal offenses. See Holsten,
490 S.E.2d at 875 n.1 1; see also Appellee's Brief at 17, Holsten, 490 S.E.2d 864. Furthermore, the
appellee's argued that a lav enforcement officer's decisions regarding a suspected drunk driver are
discretionary, which the court agreed with as well. See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 875 n.1; see also
Appellee's Brief at 18, Holsten, 490 S.E.2d 864 (citing W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-4 (1992)) (preliminary
breath analysis may be administered); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-5 (1992) (law enforcement officer may
require a person to submit to a preliminary breath analysis). Finally, the court concluded that there is
no existing statute or authority explicitly stating that a police officer's knowledge of a violation of a
statute gives rise to a higher duty when providing police protection other than the public duty doctrine
and its exceptions. See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 875 n.11.
85 Id. at 873. One case representative of the majority was Shore v. Town of Stonington, 444
A.2d 1379 (Conn. 1982). In Shore, the plaintiff brought an action against the town and one of its
police officers for his wife's death, caused by a drunk driver. See Shore, 444 A.2d at 1380. The drunk
driver had been stopped, but not arrested, by the police officer prior to the plaintiff's wife's accident.
Id. at 1381. The court concluded that the police officer's duty was to the public and that he owed no
special duty to the plaintiffs. Id. at 1380. The Holsten court also cited to Landis v. Rockdale, 445
S.E.2d at 267, which stated that "[a] clear majority of states which have considered whether police
officers have a duty to restrain a drunk driver have followed the rationale of the 'public duty'
doctrine[.]"; see also Ezell, 902 S.W.2d at 403 ("[W]ejoin the clear majority of courts and conclude
that statutes pertaining to drunk driving and public intoxication, do not, in conjunction with statutes
authorizing warrantless arrests, give rise to a 'special-duty' of care where a plaintiff alleges that a
police officer failed to arrest or detain an alleged drunk driver."); see also James L. Isham, Annotation,
Failure to Restrain Drunk Driver as Ground ofLiability of State or Local Government Unit or Officer,
48 A.L.R.4TH 320, § 2 (1986).
86 457 N.Y.S.2d 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
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asserted that an off-duty police officer had observed the drunk driver's intoxicated
condition earlier at a party. After the drunkard left on his motorcycle, the officer
called the Bethlehem Police Department, advising the duty officer that people were
leaving the party in an intoxicated condition. 7 The court held that neither the
police officer who had observed the intoxicated driver's condition nor the officer
who had received the phone call had a duty to the decedent because there was no
special relationship."
However, not all jurisdictions have followed the majority view with regard
to drunk driving accidents. For example, in Irwin v. Town of Ware,89 the court held
that the municipality was liable for damages to the injured plaintiffs because of the
negligent failure of the police officers to remove an intoxicated driver from the
highway. 0 The Irwin court reasoned that a special relationship did arise between
the plaintiff and the defendant and that such a special relationship was predicated
on "whether a defendant could reasonably foresee that he would be expected to take
affirmative action to protect the plaintiff and could anticipate harm to the plaintiff
for failure to do so."'" Furthermore, the court held that "[w]here the risk created by
the negligence of a municipal employee is of immediate and foreseeable physical
injury to persons who cannot reasonably protect themselves from it, a duty of care
reasonably should be found."92 However, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has not chosen to follow the Irwin decision and its interpretation of the
public duty doctrine. Rather, the court concluded that without evidence showing
that a special relationship exists, "neither a local governmental entity's liability nor
a police officer's liability to that particular individual may be predicated upon the
police officer's failure to restrain a tortfeasor who is driving while intoxicated or
under the influence of alcohol and subsequently causes an injury to [that] particular
87 See id. at 619.
88 Id.
89 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984). In Irwin, the plaintiffs alleged that the police officers of the
town negligently failed to take a motor vehicle operator into protective custody who was intoxicated
and subsequently caused the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 1295; see also Bailey v. Town of Forks, 737
P.2d 1257, 1259 (Wash. 1987) (applying basic tort principles, such as foreseeability and policy
considerations, as opposed to the public duty doctrine to discern whether there was a duty between a
motorcycle driver who was injured after colliding with a truck driven by an intoxicated driver and the
police officer who knew the driver was drunk).
90 See Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1310-11.




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss1/12
HOLSTENv. MASSEY
individual... ."' Therefore, based upon this analysis, the court determined the
circuit court correctly entered summary judgment for the appellees based on the
public duty doctrine.94
B. The Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act
The Holsten court also assessed the appellees' liability with regard to the
common law in light of the applicable legislation and stated that "regardless of
whether the public duty doctrine gives rise to a cause of action, we conclude that
the appellees would be immune under the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance
Reform Act."' In addition, the court noted that although the public duty doctrine
determines a municipality's liability, it will be read in context with the Act, "unless
it clearly appears from the statute that the purpose of the statute was to change the
common law." 6 Because different provisions apply to each of the appellees, the
court treated each one separately.
1. Deputy Greene
The appellant first asserted that Deputy Greene was not immune from
liability because, as an employee,9 "[h]is acts... or omissions were.., in a wanton
or reckless manner[.]J " The appellant relied on Mallamo v. Town of Rivesville,99
93 HoIsten v. Massey, 490 S.E.2d 864, 875 (W. Va. 1997):
94 See id.
95 Id.
96 Id. (citing Smith v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 295 S.E.2d 680, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va.
1982)).
97 Employee is defined as follows:
[A]n officer, agent, employee, or servant, whether compensated or not,
whether full-time or not, who is authorized to act and is acting within the
scope of his or her employment for a political subdivision. 'Employee'
includes any elected or appointed official of a political subdivision.
'Employee' does not include an independent contractor of a political
subdivision."
W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-3(a) (1992). Deputy Greene's qualification as an employee was not disputed.
See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 876 n.13.
98 W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(b)(2) (1992); see also Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 876. The court noted
that the "wanton and reckless manner" exception is an exception separate and distinct from the public
duty doctrine. See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 876. The court stated that since the legislature has the
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in which the court concluded that summary judgment had been improperly entered
against the plaintiff because he had provided enough evidence of a malicious
purpose or bad faith on the part of the police to raise a question of fact under West
Virginia Code chapter twenty nine, article 12A, section 5(b)(2).' Although the
court determined what kind of showing was required for a "malicious purpose" or
"bad faith," nothing was mentioned about the evidence needed to show "willful,
wanton or reckless conduct."'01
In order to ascertain what kind of showing is required to demonstrate
willful, wanton or reckless conduct, the Holsten court defined the phrase as follows:
[T]he actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable
character in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he
must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it
highly probable that harm would follow. It usually is accompanied
by a conscious indifference to the consequences, amounting almost
to willingness that they shall follow; and it has been said that this
is indispensable.
In applying this standard to Deputy Greene's conduct, the court found that he did
not act in a "willful, wanton or reckless manner." There was no evidence that
Deputy Greene intentionally failed to quickly investigate the 1992 Accident or that
he was "consciously indifferent" of the possibility that Massey would be involved
authority to abrogate the common law, failure to expressly abrogate the special relationship exception
must mean that West Virginia Code chapter 29, articlel2A, section 5(b)(2) is another exception to the
public duty doctrine. See id The Holsten court also cited Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498 (Ill.
1994). In Doe, the court stated that "the judicially created special duty exception and the statutory
willful and wanton exception were separate and distinct exceptions to municipal and officer liability.
... 'Incorporating a willful and wanton requirement into the special duty doctrine would therefore
yield the anomalous result of making recovery more difficult.., than it already is under the statute.'.
Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 505 (quoting Leone v. City of Chicago, 619 N.E.2d 119 (Ill. 1993)).
99 477 S.E.2d 525 (W. Va. 1996).
100 See id. at 535. In Mallamo, the police shot and injured the plaintiff who was hiding in the
closet while attempting to arrest him for failing to appear for a court proceeding. Id. at 527-28. West
Virginia Code, chapter 29, article 12A, section 5(b)(2) states, "[a]n employee of a political subdivision
is immune from liability unless... [h]is or her acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad
faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner."
101 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 877.
102 Id. (citing Cline v. Joy Mfg. Co., 310 S.E.2d 835, 838 n.6 (W. Va. 1983) (quoting W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 185 (4th ed. 1971)).
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in another accident four months later. 3 Thus, the court concluded that the
appellant failed to assert any evidence of reckless conduct which would render
summary judgment improper.
2. The County Commission of Boone County
The appellant further alleged that the county commission' was not
immune from liability because political subdivisions are liable for death caused by
the negligent acts of employees while acting within the scope of their
employment."5 Although the appellant conceded that a political subdivision is
immune from liability when the injury results from the method of providing police
protection,"°6 he asserted that this kind of immunity was inapplicable based on the
court's" holding in Beckley v. Crabtree. 7 However, the court stated that the
appellant overlooked the integral language of West Virginia Code chapter twenty,
article 12A, section 5(a)(5) which states that a "political subdivision is immune
103 See id at 877-878. The court further points out that even though the record indicates that the
investigation took over three months, that should not imply that Deputy Greene acted in a reckless
manner. Id. at 878.
104 Under West Virginia Code, chapter 29, article 12A, section 3(c), a county commission is
considered a political subdivision. W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-3(c) (1992).
105 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
107 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 878 (citing Beckley v. Crabtree, 428 S.E.2d 317, 320 (W. Va.
1993) (holding that the method of providing police protection refers to the governmental decisions as
to how to provide police protection and that these decisions remain immune from liability) (citing State
v. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784, 787-788 (Tex. 1979))). In Beckley, a state trooper was injured when a
sheriff attempted to place a shotgun in the trunk of the police car and the shotgun accidentally
discharged. See ia at 318. The trooper brought a negligence action against the sheriff and the county
commission in which the court held that the sheriff was immune under West Virginia Code chapter
29, article 12A, section 5(b) and that the county commission could be held liable under West Virginia
Code, chapter 29, article 12A, section 5(a) because the sheriff was not involved in the implementation
of policy decision when the shotgun discharged. Id. at 321. The court also stated that "[riesolution
of the issue of whether a loss or claim occurs as a result of the method of providing law enforcement
protection requires determining whether the allegedly negligent act resulted from the manner in which
a formulatedpolicy regarding such protection was implemented." Id. (emphasis added); see also
Mallamo v. Town of Rivesville, 477 S.E.2d 525, 535 (W. Va. 1996) (stating that the phrase "'method
of providing police protection.., is aimed at such basic matters as the type and number of... police
cars considered necessary for the operation of the respective departments; how many personnel might
be required; [and] how many and where police patrol cars are to operate."') (quoting Jackson v. City
of Kansas City, 680 P.2d 877, 890 (Kan. 1984)).
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from liability if a loss or claim results from ... the failure to provide.., police
[protection]."' As the court pointed out, the phrases "method of providing" and
"failure to provide" are inherently different and carry substantially different
meanings.109 Furthermore, because the language is clear and unambiguous, the
court found no reason to interpret it."0 Thus, the court concluded that the county
commission was immune from liability because Deputy Greene's failure to
incarcerate Massey should a failure to provide adequate police protection and
should, therefore, fall under West Virginia Code chapter twenty nine, article 12A,
section 5(a)(5)."' Moreover, the court concluded that summary judgment was
correctly entered against the appellant because the appellees were immune under
the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act."
2
V. THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE: IS IT INCONSISTENT WITH LOCAL
GOVERNMENTAL TORT CLAIMS AND INSURANCE REFORM ACTS?
Some jurisdictions have abandoned the public duty doctrine in light of the
adoption of insurance reform legislation. The most repeated argument in favor of
the abandonment of the public duty doctrine and its exceptions is that "it is
confusing and leads to inequitable, unpredictable, and irreconcilable results."
' 3
One judge even wrote, "[a]ny court-created tort-immunity rule should be
forthrightly abandoned when its injustice and its unreality are so evident as to
produce exceptions, interpretations and inconsistencies galore.' 4 Furthermore,
these jurisdictions argue that concerns over excessive governmental or public
employee liability are without foundation because of the limitations on liability
afforded by local legislation, conventional tort principles, and exceptions to waivers
108 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 878 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(5) (1992) (emphasis
added)).
109 See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 879.
110 Id. (citing State v. Elder, 165 S.E.2d 108, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va. 1968)).
III Id. at 880.
112 Id.
113 See, e.g., Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier, 638 A.2d 561, 566 (Vt. 1993) (citing Leake
v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo. 1986); Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305, 313 (Mass.
1993) (Liacos, C.J., concurring)).
114 See Jean W., 610 N.E.2d at 310 (citing Motykav. City of Amsterdam, 204 N.E.2d 635, 637
(N.Y. 1965) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting)).
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of sovereign immunity" Basically, these jurisdictions attempt to justify why they
decline to adopt another means of limiting liability for the government and its
employees when these entities are already protected to some extent.
1 6
Policy reasons also play a dominant role in support of the doctrine's
abandonment especially the need to compensate those who are seriously injured by
the government or its agents' tortious acts." 7 The argument follows that the
government should be responsible in damages to any plaintiff injured by one of its
employees acting within the scope of his employment and that damages should be
viewed as simply the cost of administration."' It is assumed that the government
is more suited to bear the cost because the costs can be allocated to the public
through taxation. "19
Furthermore, the jurisdictions in favor of the doctrine's abandonment
emphasize that the purpose of many of the state Governmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform Acts is to treat public entities (i.e., political subdivisions and their
employees) the same as private persons subjected to liability.2 Accordingly, these
jurisdictions intend to subject the government and its employees to conventional
tort principles when determining liability, in which the plaintiff would have to make
the same showing as he would when utilizing the special relationship exception.''
115 See Hudson, 638 A.2d at 566 (citing Leake, 720 P.2d at 160; Jean W., 610 N.E.2d at 313-
14).
116 Id at 568.
117 See Krause, supra note 1, at 503.
118 Id (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953) (holding that government should
assume obligation to pay damages caused by public employees)).
119 Id. (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 978 (4th ed. 1971)).
120 See, e.g., Jean W., 610 N.E.2d at 312 (Liacos, C.J., concurring).
121 See Krause, supra note 1, at 523 n.123, stating that
In an action for negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) facts which give rise to a legal duty on the part of the defendant to conform to the
standard of conduct [duty],
(b) failure of the defendant to conform to the standard of conduct [breach of duty],
(c) that such failure is a legal cause of the harm suffered by the plaintiff [proximate cause],
and
(d) that the plaintiff has in fact suffered harm of a kind legally compensable by damages
[damages].
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1976).
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These jurisdictions also believe that the status of being a government entity
alone should not dictate an entity's liability.'22 Proponents argue that the use of
conventional tort principles will still protect the government from liability because
the mere existence of a duty does not give rise to liability: there must be a breach,
proximate cause, and damages."2 However, these advocates do not ignore that
plaintiffs confront problems when trying to establish proximate cause, especially
when a public employee's purported negligence stems from a situation which he did
not cause.24  In order to combat this dilemma, courts will have to rely on
foreseeability and immediacy of the harm more heavily!' In applying these tort
principles to police protection, it is urged that
The use of an ordinary negligence standard would not impose an
absolute duty.., to protect its citizens and to enforce its laws; nor
would it require that the police be at the scene of every crime.
Rather, police departments would be held to a standard of due care,
and their liability appropriately limited by the requirements of
proximate cause and foreseeability
26
Plus, use of conventional tort principles would at least give the plaintiff a chance
to have a jury assess a municipality and/or a police officer's negligence. 127
Opponents of the doctrine's abandonment urge, however, that judges and juries
would make improper decisions when assessing public entities' liability because
they are ill-suited to evaluate governmental decisions concerning the allocation of
resources to protect the public.22 But in response, most police activities can be
evaluated using documentary evidence and expert testimony.
122 See Jean W., 610 N.E.2d at 315 (Liacos, C.J., concurring).
123 Id. at 314.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Krause, supra note 1, at 524.
127 Id. at 526.
128 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
129 See Krause, supra note 1, at 526. The author admits that there is still a need for police
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Finally, proponents of abandoning the doctrine assert that although
elimination would undoubtedly create broader liability, the effects on judicial and
municipal resources would be negligible.3 First, establishing liability would be
difficult because not only would a plaintiff have to demonstrate a duty and a breach,
but he would also have to show that it was the political subdivision's act or
omission that was the proximate cause to his injuries.13 Furthermore, a plaintiff
might also be found to be contributory negligent.' Second, the economical impact
on resources for torts committed by political subdivisions could be curbed by
statutory limitations on recovery and the prohibition of punitive damages 33
The arguments in favor of the doctrine's retention are equally, if not more,
compelling than those in favor of its abandonment. Two major rationales that
support sovereign immunity also support the public duty doctrine and its exceptions.
First, the protection of governmental agencies and their employees from the random
imposition of liability by judicial authority is a necessary function.' Furthermore,
the inevitable conflicts of authority among the jurisdictions would interfere with the
political subdivision's decision-making.35 Second, adverse judgments against the
government would require the use of funds essential to functions (i.e., police and
fire protection) that protect the general public.136 Furthermoie, political
subdivisions would be so inundated with lawsuits that additional funds would be
used to defend claims.
37
Courts have also argued that the public duty doctrine
fairly reflects current social values and promotes sound public
policy. It not only promises reasonably predictable results in cases
... involving harm indirectly (secondarily) caused by a public
employee's failure to act in response to a situation the employee
130 Id. at 527.
131 Id.
132 Id at 528.
133 Id. The author concedes, however, that these measures would require additional financial
resources. Id
134 See Krause, supra note 1, at 502.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 503.
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did not create, but also establishes a reasonable balance between
competing values: the compensation of injured individuals and the
protection of government from financial burdens of such
magnitude as to threaten its ability to function." '
Furthermore, to expose a political subdivision to liability every time a plaintiff is
unsatisfied with a political subdivision (i.e., failure to provide adequate police
and/or fire protection) would be catastrophic to large urban areas where liability
could be limitless.'39 Another point made by those jurisdictions is that because tort
reform legislation treats public employers the same as private employers, a public
employer should not be liable for failing to prevent or diminish harm due to a
situation that it did not create.
40
The dichotomy among jurisdictions demonstrates the differences among
policy considerations, specifically economic issues. Can the argument among
jurisdictions be resolved if it can be determined who should bear the loss? Or is one
begging the question because the answer to who should bear the loss seems to create
a controversy unto its own?
VI. CONCLUSION
Whenever an innocent person dies it is an autonomic reflex to assign the
blame. However, should a political subdivision - in this case, a sheriff's
department and a county commission - be held liable for failure to prevent a death
by not providing adequate police protection? It would simply be impractical to hold
these entities accountable. To reiterate the holding of Holsten v. Massey and those
jurisdictions that maintain the public duty doctrine in their systems, the financial
effects would be too burdensome, and the floodgates to liability would open wide.
The use of conventional tort principles is an option, but even then, litigation would
be expanded because of the relaxed standard in determining if a duty exists. Those
jurisdictions who favor abandoning the doctrine ignore an important distinction
when concluding that the local legislation abrogates the common law: the public
duty doctrine determines if a duty exists and the local Governmental Tort Claims
and Insurance Reform Acts assess liability after a duty has been determined. Thus,
with this inherent difference among the two authorities, why is it impossible for the
138 Jean W, 610 N.E.2d at 31& (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Cyran v. Town of Ware,
597 N.E.2d 1352 (Mass. 1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
139 Id. (quoting Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1352).
140 Id. at 320.
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two to coexist without any detriment to the public? Certainly it is not impossible,
and as Holsten demonstrates, it is preferable for these different authorities to
coincide.
"A duty to all ... is a duty to none."'
141
Stephanie M Bonnett*
141 Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo. 1986) (citing Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian
River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla. 1979); Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976)).
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